Proudneocon

Some very bad economic news today:

The Treasury Department said Wednesday the April deficit soared to $82.7 billion, the largest imbalance for that month on record. That was significantly higher than last year's April deficit of $20 billion and above the $30 billion deficit private economists had anticipated.

The government normally runs surpluses in April as millions of taxpayers file their income tax returns. However, income tax payments were down this April, reflecting the impact of the recession which has pushed millions of people out of work.

Federal budget deficit hits April record

We normally run surpluses in April, as the article says. This year, we didn't, because of the recession.

But not only did we run a deficit, we ran a deficit almost 3 times larger than what was predicted, even given the recession. This is very bad news.

Also worth pointing out is the fact that the Obama administration in the month of April ran up deficits that it would have taken Bush almost 3 months to reach even at the height of his spending in 2004.

Now, I'm not one to complain without offering a solution, and the article mentions the three main causes of the deficit, which we can use to figure out how to fix it:

Analysts estimate that roughly one-third of the increase in the deficits over the past two years came from lost revenue — the result of fewer people working and lower corporate profits. Another third is from increased government spending that normally occurs in a downturn, such as higher payments for unemployment benefits and food stamps. The final third reflects the added government spending on the $787 billion stimulus bill and the $700 billion financial bailout.

The first one-third of spending is due to fewer people working and corporations making lower profits. To fix that, we need to get more people working, and ensure that corporations bring in higher profits. The easiest way to do that is to pass tax cuts for corporations.

The second one-third unfortunately can't be helped directly, since it's mainly unemployment benefits and other items of financial relief for the unemployed and the underemployed. However, a corporate tax cut would make it possible for corporations to hire more people, thus reducing unemployment. So tax cuts for corporations are doubly necessary at this time.

The final one-third is caused by the Obama administration's stimulus spending (some stimulus, eh?). In this case, some of the damage has already been done, but we can at least plug the leak by freezing this administration's stimulus spending until a more cost-effective stimulus package can be put together.

Pass deeper tax cuts for corporations, and put a stop to Obama's stimulus plan. That's the way forward. Now we see who is for going forward, and who is for going backwards.

The two top leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq have been reported and (thus far) confirmed dead by both the Iraqi government and the commander of the U.S. military in Iraq, Gen. Raymond Odierno. The two terrorists were killed in a joint Iraqi-American raid on a safe house just southwest of Tikrit.

An Egyptian native, Abdul-Monim al-Badawi, better known by his pseudonyms Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, joined the Muslim Brotherhood and in 1982 joined Egyptian Islamic Jihad, becoming the protege of future al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 1999, the year after Egyptian Islamic Jihad was absorbed by Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, Masri traveled to Afghanistan and trained under bin Laden. After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Masri escaped to Iraq, where he reemerged as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's lieutenant after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. He helped establish the insurgent cell in Baghdad, worked to bring in suicide bombers from Syria, and fought in the Battle of Fallujah. Masri quickly replaced Zarqawi after the latter was killed by American forces in 2006. He became the "War Minister" of the "Islamic State of Iraq", which replaced the Mujahideen Shura Council, an umbrella group including al-Qaeda in Iraq and several other terrorist groups, a few months later. Though taking a lower profile, Masri proved to be just as deadly as Zarqawi, and was a major driver of Iraq's spiral into would-be civil war prior to the American "surge" in 2007.

Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi, the Iraqi better known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was appointed leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council, later becoming the "prince" of the "Islamic State of Iraq". The Council's main intention in appointing Baghdadi was to put an Iraqi face on what was otherwise a primarily foreign insurgency. Analysts generally regarded him as a figurehead, assuming that most of the real authority was held by Zarqawi and then Masri.

Both men have previously been rumored to have been captured, killed, or even fictitious, but Odierno's statement is the highest-profile confirmation of their deaths since they first emerged. It is my opinion that both terrorists are finally dead.

It is uncertain who will replace Masri and Baghdadi. The "Islamic State of Iraq" still has nine "cabinet" members who may still be alive. I judge that the two most likely replacement figures are Abu Abdul Rahman al-Falahi, the group's "Prime Minister", and Abu Abdul Jabar al-Janabi, its "Security Minister". I am not sure if both leaders will be replaced, or if the leadership positions will be consolidated into one, as was the case during most of Zarqawi's time as al-Qaeda in Iraq's leader. It is also possible that the Islamic State of Iraq is in such a dire situation that it will simply fragment rather than appointing a single leader.

Whatever happens, the deaths of Masri and Baghdadi have dealt a serious blow to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and put the United States one step closer to a victorious withdrawal.

Iraqi National Movement (secular list, including the lists of former Prime Minister Allawi, Vice President Hashimi, and Mutlaq): 91 seats
State of Law Coalition (Maliki's non-sectarian Shiite nationalist bloc): 89 seats
National Iraqi Alliance (Iran-backed Shiite Islamist sectarian bloc, including Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Sadrists, and Chalabi's secular party): 70 seats
Kurdistani Alliance (the two main secular Kurdish parties): 43 seats
Movement for Change (Kurdish opposition party): 8 seats
Unity Alliance of Iraq (alliance between Sunni Awakening Movement and Interior Minister Bolani's secular party): 4 seats
Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni Islamist anti-debaathificiation sectarian alliance): 6 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union (Muslim Brotherhood backed Kurdish Islamist party): 4 seats
Islamic Group of Kurdistan (Kurdish Islamist party accused of links with Ansar al-Islam terrorists): 2 seats
Designated Minority Seats: 8 seats

Allawi's movement won the popular vote, but Maliki's coalition won the seven provinces (Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Basra, Babil, Wasit, and Muthanna, all in the Shiite south), to Allawi's four (Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninawa, in the more diverse central and northern Iraq). The Shiite sectarian alliance fared poorly, winning only three provinces (Qadisiyyah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan, all in the Shiite south). The Kurds won the expected four provinces in the north (Arbil, Sulaymanniyyah, Dahuk, and the significant prize of Kirkuk).

As leader of the bloc holding the most seats in Iraq's Parliament, Allawi has the right of first attempt at forming a ruling majority government, with himself as Prime Minister. No party won an outright majority, so alliances between parties will be necessary. It is likely that Allawi will ally with other secular, nationalist, and non-sectarian parties, such as the Unity Alliance. Also, no party has yet been able to rule democratic Iraq without the Kurds, so the Kurdistani Alliance will be a major partner in any alliance. That makes 140 so far, out of the needed 163.

To make up for the remainder, the two largest parties and their leaders, Allawi and Maliki, will probably have to suck up their pride and form a coalition. That would permit Allawi to lead a coalition government of more than 220 seats, a wide majority. Though the two parties agree on much, especially nationalism and to a lesser degree secularism, there is an ego-driven animosity between Allawi and Maliki. It is possible that neither would be willing to accept the other as Prime Minister, in which case the most likely alternative would be a compromise candidate.

The most plausible compromise candidate, in my opinion, would be Abdul Karim al-Anizi, leader of the Islamic Dawa Party - Iraq Organisation, a member of Maliki's State of Law Coalition. He was previously considered as a compromise candidate by the previous ruling bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance, when former Prime Minister Jaafari was rejected by the UIA's coalition partners. It is not likely that any of the other major party leaders in Allawi's Iraqi National Movement would be seen as acceptable candidates--Hashimi and Mutlaq are both Sunnis, and Mutlaq in particular is strongly opposed by Maliki.

An alternative coalition, which I see as much less likely, would invite the Shiite Islamists of the National Iraqi Alliance to join with Allawi's bloc and the Kurds, giving them a combined total of about 210 seats. I say this alternative is less plausible, because of the serious mismatch between Allawi's secular nationalist agenda and the NIA's Shiite Islamist sectarian agenda.

One final possibility is that, if Allawi fails to form a government, Maliki could attempt to form a government with himself as head, which would allow him to stay on as Prime Minister. Maliki would likely need to enlist the aid of his old allies in the National Iraqi Alliance, along with the Kurds, which would give him about 200 seats. A difficulty here is that the rift between Maliki and his old allies has grown over time, and the two blocs have more strongly differing agendas than they used to, with Maliki becoming more secular, nationalist, and skeptical of Iran, and the NIA becoming more Islamist, sectarian, and friendly with Iran.

In summary, I find it most likely that Allawi (or possibly Anizi) will be the next Prime Minister of Iraq, leading a coalition government consisting of Allawi's Iraqi National Movement, Maliki's State of Law Coalition, the Kurdistani Alliance, and perhaps a few minor parties--over 220 seats in total. The National Iraqi Alliance would then be the major opposition party in the Iraqi Parliament. Fortunately, this outcome is probably also the most favorable outcome from the United States' perspective.

Obamacare passes 219-212.
Reconciliation bill passes 220-211.

A news item today reports that both Israel and Syria have announced their intention to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs.

I see this as an opportunity for resolving part of the current Middle East debacle. I suggest that Israel should offer to work with Syria in developing nuclear energy.

How would this be helpful? I can think of two ways:

1. Syria is already suspected of working on a secret, non-peaceful nuclear program in association with Iran and North Korea. The Syrian facility bombed by Israel in 2007 is believed to have been part of this program. Cooperating on nuclear energy would allow Israel unprecedented access to Syria's nuclear infrastructure, allowing Israel to ensure that what Syria is announcing as a peaceful nuclear energy program remains peaceful.

2. This could create a turning point in relations between Syria and the West. The prospect of developing a peaceful nuclear energy program with Israel could serve to finally pry Syria away from Iran's axis of evil. Why be the nuclear whipping boy for a rogue state when you can develop your own peaceful nuclear program with the blessing and assistance of the international community?

Syria, of course, may reject such an offer from Israel, or they may prefer to have it both ways, maintaining both a peaceful public nuclear energy program and a secret military nuclear weaponization program. But I think the possibility of cooperation with Syria is something Israel and her allies should seriously consider.